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Almost all reasonably educated people know a little about Plato (c. 428-348 
BC): that he was a student of Socrates (c. 469-399 BC) and a very significant 
ancient Greek philosopher who believed in a world of forms, as well as 
believing that we have an immortal soul. According to the mathematician and 
philosopher A.N. Whitehead (1861-1947), the philosophy of Western 
Europe consists of ‘footnotes to Plato’ (1929, 62/1978, 39). In fact, however, 
Plato is nothing like other philosophers – he is difficult to handle. He wrote 
dialogues in which everyone but himself took the floor. He himself is hidden. 
Yes, he is the author, but who was he? What exactly is his writing? Why did 
he write dialogues almost exclusively? What did Plato say, i.e., mean? Did 
he even have a philosophy? And why should we continue to study him today 
after almost 2,500 years? 
Given the difficulty of entering this important and unique work,  
after describing Plato’s life and works, we will first discuss how to 
understand and read Plato with the form and content problems of his work.  
This discussion started in ancient times and is still ongoing. And there is 
progress on this front! Then, with the right tools, we will try to draw up 
what might be described as Plato’s own ‘philosophy’, but which in reality 
should be more correctly called Plato’s ‘project’. 
 
Our sources regarding Plato’s life 
The main sources, in addition to Plato’s 7th Letter, are fragments in the 
Herculean Index Academicorum,1 in the earliest preserved vita in 
Apuleius (c. 125-180), and later in Diogenes Laertius (D.L.)(3rd cent. 
AD), 
 
 
1  Mekler ed. 1902/1958 p. 6, col. 10. History of the Academy recently attributed to 
Philodemus (by publisher Tiziano Dorandi 1991). 
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Fig. 1 Portrait of Plato. Roman replica of a Greek statue 
from about 350 BC. Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen 
 
in the Life and Opinions of Famous Philosophers and Olympiodoros the 
younger (6th cent.).  Critical of Plato are Athenaeus (2nd cent. AD), who 
follows, among others, the historian Theopompus (c. 375-320 BC), and 
the music theorist and philosopher Aristoxenus (c. 360-300 BC), who 
claimed that almost all of the Republic existed in the sophist Protagoras
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(c. 481-411 BC) (D.L. 3.37). Other material is found in  the essayist and 
biographer Plutarchus (c. 45-120 AD) and in the biographer C. Nepos (c. 100-
24 BC) in their biographies of Dion (c. 409-354 BC). 
Plato came from one of Athens’ better families. He was the son of Ariston 
(c. 465-424 BC) and Perictione. Critias (c. 460-403 BC) was the cousin and 
Charmides is the brother of Perictione, both members of the junta, the thirty 
tyrants (404-403 BC). Plato had two older brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon. 
He was a student of Socrates who walked around at the agora in Athens and 
interviewed young sons of the better bourgeoisie.2 It was the last decade of the 
5th century and of the Peloponnese War (432-404 BC), which ended 
disastrously for Athens with the demolition of the walls and the installation of 
a Spartan junta. In other words, Plato grew up in a period of war, the 
degeneration of democracy into mob rule, and the political turmoil that 
followed Athens’ defeat to Sparta. Perhaps most importantly, he was the most 
famous student of Socrates. After Socrates’ death in 399, Plato travelled to 
Megara and then (perhaps) to Egypt and (probably) to Archytas in Tarentum (c. 
430-365 BC) in southern Italy and in 387 BC to Syracuse, where he spent some 
time with the tyrant Dionysius I (c. 430-367 BC) and his brother-in-law Dion. 
After returning home, Plato founded the world’s first university in Academus’ 
grove on the outskirts of Athens. Here he wrote (among other things) his 
magnum opus, the Republic, which is also a main work in a European context, 
where the idea is that the ideal state requires either that the ruler becomes a 
philosopher, or that we have a ‘philosopher on the throne’. He was invited by 
Dion on his second trip to Sicily after Dionysius I’s death in 367 BC, where he 
taught his son Dionysius II (c. 396-337 BC) philosophy. Dion was driven out 
and Plato was imprisoned, but he returned home in 365. Plato undertook one 
last unsuccessful trip to Sicily in 361 BC. Dion returned to Syracuse in 357 BC 
and expelled Dionysius but was murdered soon after.  Plato sent his 7th Letter 
(our main source) to Dion’s followers. 
 
Plato’s writing 
What Plato found valuable was the interaction with Socrates and his 
students. This is reflected in his writing, which is unique in consisting almost 
 
2 Cf. 7th Letter, Plato’s famous student for 20 years, Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius.  
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entirely of dialogues. It is all preserved, about 25 genuine dialogues (several 
illegitimate ones were added in antiquity after his death), the Apology and 13 
letters (the authenticity of which has been constantly disputed, although the 
autobiographical 7th Letter is fortunately generally accepted today). The work 
(Corpus) was published by Aristophanes of Byzantium (c. 257-180 BC, chief 
librarian in Alexandria c. 190) ‘arbitrarily’ in 5 trilogies (groups of three) (D.L. 
3.61) and ‘dramatically more than philosophically’ divided into the categories 
dramatic, narrative and mixed (D.L. 3.50). A few hundred years later, the 
dialogues were published by Thrasylus (Tiberius’ astrologer) in 9 tetralogies 
(groups of four) as the works of tragedy writers (D.L. 3.56), for instance 
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo (=the life of the philosopher). In D.L. 
(3.62) there is a list of works which were already considered spurious in 
antiquity. The following works in Thrasylus are widely considered spurious 
today: Alkibiades II, Hipparchos, Rivals, Minos, Theages and Cleitopho. In 
addition, the authenticity of other dialogues such as Hippias Major, 
Epinomis, Alkibiades I, Ion and Menexenus is still being debated.3 
The chronology and associated development of Plato’s philosophy is 
debated, for instance involving the inclusion of stylistic studies (stylometry), 
most recently by L. Brandwood and G.R. Ledger. But others use literary 
considerations such as vivid style in Phaedrus, direct conversation as opposed to 
reported conversation and considerations of content, including cross-references 
as well as references to external events. According to L. Brandwood (1990), the 
following four groups can be isolated (the internal chronology of Groups I and 
II is unresolved): 
 
I: Apology, Crito, Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Protagoras, 
Ion, Gorgias, Meno 
II: Lysis, Hippias Major, Euthydemus, Cratylus, Menexenus, Phaedo, 
Symposium 
 
3 Plato’s writings have recently been published in a Danish translation in  6 volumes 
edited by J. Mejer and G. Tortzen (2009-2015). They follow Thrasylus’ division into 9 
tetralogies, as opposed to the previous Danish translation (1932-1941) edited by C. 
Høeg (1896-1961) and H. Ræder (1869-1959), which followed an assumed 
chronological order, defended by, e.g., Hans Ræder (1905). The division into 
tetralogies may derive from an earlier Alexandrian or even an Academic edition 
(Lesky 544). 
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III: Republic, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Phaedrus 
IV: Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Laws, Epinomis, Letters 
 
 More recently, as we shall see, the idea of development in authorship has 
come under criticism, and there has been a return to the previous unitarian 
notion that authorships should be seen as a whole and a unity. But the main 
features of the above-mentioned chronology are hard to dispute. Therefore, 
it is maintained here and can be seen as follows: 
 
Early inconclusive (aporetic) dialogues 
Socrates wants definitions and tests the interlocutor’s moral concepts with 
examination and refutatory conversation (elenchus): what is X (e.g., 
justice)? Y! (e.g., helping friends and bothering enemies). But Υ (e.g., if 
you are mistaken by friends and enemies) leads to Z (e.g., helping the bad 
and harming the good), which goes against common opinion, which the 
interlocutor cannot drop. So, -Υ. Well, then it must be Q. Same procedure 
again. Usual result: puzzlement (aporia). 
 
Transitional and middle dialogues (constructive dialogues) 
The format is indirect (account of previous interview). Refutation 
(elenchus) is abandoned as the only method, and the questions are now 
leading, not real. The dialogue in, for example, the Republic is fictitious, as 
it was written some 50 years after a dramatic date when Plato was only 5-6 
years old. The subjects are the doctrine of ideas (the transcendent forms, that 
is, structures) and our knowledge of this doctrine, as well as morality, 
philosophy of society and immortality. Thus, the Republic is full of Platonic 
‘presentations’ on everything: ethics, politics, psychology, metaphysics, art, 
religion, education, medicine, etc., but it constitutes in particular an association 
of ethics and metaphysics. 
 
Late dialogues 
The indirect format is abandoned. Socrates slides into the background as the 
keynote speaker. The topics are now: being/not being and the communion of 
the most important all-pervading forms of existence, sameness and difference, 
and motion and rest, a more concrete, realistic political philosophy, cosmology 
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and the good life in practice. Plato seems to revise the doctrine of forms and 
introduce a new philosophical method, the method of division. 
 
Dialogue form 
The form of dialogue was common among Socrates’ students and reflects 
Plato’s view of what philosophy (dialectic) is. Plato does not write in the first-
person singular (I) and does not act himself (‘Platonic anonymity’), but may 
have named the dialogues after relatives and friends.4 Behind the picture of 
Socrates in the early dialogues, we seem to have the historical Socrates with 
the provocative, inconclusive conversations. In the middle dialogues, Socrates 
(if anywhere) seems to be Plato’s mouthpiece in advancing constructive ideas; 
while later in Timaeus, Sophist and Statesman he is a subordinate figure, and in 
the Laws he is non-existent. In these, the Pythagorean Timaeus, the Eleatic 
Stranger or the Stranger of Athens leads the way. 
Socrates, with his critical moral conversations with the young aristocrats, 
became a thorn in the side of contemporary democracy and, in particular, the 
restored democracy after the junta’s eight months of intermezzo (404-403 BC). 
Then came the time of soul-searching to put an end to what went wrong in the 
last years of the war, and despite a general amnesty Socrates still became a victim. 
He was not accused of treason, but of corrupting young people and godlessness. 
And he was sentenced to death in 399 BC after a self-conscious and provocative 
defense in the 501-member jury. One can read about this in the famous Apology. 
 It was against this dramatic background that Plato chose the dialogue 
as his medium. He could have chosen matter-of-fact prose like the early 
Ionic philosophers, aphorisms such as Heraclitus (c. 540-480 BC), or 
hexameters such as Parmenides (c. 540-470 BC) or Empedocles (c. 484-424 
BC). But perhaps he chose the form of dialogue for several reasons. Here 
he could most vividly recount what he had experienced as a youngster in 
conversations with Socrates: discussions of moral and political issues, and, 
of course, without appearing himself. An author can afford to remain 
anonymous. And perhaps it suited Plato well to remain anonymous. Among 
other things, it may have been a precaution: the authorities could not come 
after him with accusations claiming that his statements made him harmful 
 
4 We have references to several (well-known) named dialogues already in Aristotle (Bonitz, 
Index Aristotelicus 598 ff.).  
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to society, because Plato himself was not saying anything directly. His 
writings are fictional, and he is therefore hidden behind his dialogue 
characters. A bit like Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) hiding, for other 
reasons, behind pseudonyms. A third reason for choosing the form of 
dialogue is that Plato is an artist. Plato writes mimetically (that is, mimicry and 
drama, as in tragedy and comedy (Republic 394c)), although he prefers a 
mixture of narrative and mimesis (as in epic poetry), and is mimetically 
restrictive and only accepts imitations of good persons (Republic 396c-e, 
398a8-b8). Stylistically speaking, the dialogue lies somewhere between poetry 
and prose, according to Aristotle (384-322 BC) (D.L. 3.37); and like drama it 
is filled with irony, myths, poetry and rhetoric. This all appealed to Plato’s 
artistic nerve (see D.L. 3.47-66 on the dialogue genre and interpretation). But 
in addition, there is a fourth philosophical reason for choosing dialogue: 
 
Criticism of writing 
Plato perceives writing as inferior (a paradox: an author condemning the 
book!). The written text is secondary, contains nothing clear and reliable: the 
written logos (statements) resembles a painting, as it is a helpless depicting of 
the living logos (speech, conversation, dialectic) that is knowledge ‘written’ in 
the soul of the learner (Phaedrus 276a5-6). 
The author who knows about justice, beauty and the good ‘sows his literary 
garden’, that is, writes down for his own pleasure reminders for the 
knowledgeable and for those who will follow him when he plays with words 
and tells myths of justice and the like (Phaedrus 276d). However, the oral 
dialectic is preferable, because it ‘sows’ logoi (statements or arguments) with 
knowledge in an appropriate soul. These arguments can defend themselves and 
develop and make the possessor happy (Phaedrus 276e-277a). 
 Plato concludes his presentation in Phaedrus by saying that any 
written work (rhetorical, political, etc.) is objectionable if the author believes 
that it contains important lasting truths. All writing is necessarily pleasure 
literature, and no work of poetry or prose must be taken seriously, nor what 
has been said and performed for the sake of persuasion, without any 
reference to questioning and teaching. The written text can only be a 
reminder for those who already know. Clarity perfection and seriousness 
belong only in what is learned and said to inform and truly written in the 
soul about justice, beauty and goodness. This is logoi that arise and grow in 
the soul itself and are its true property (277d-278b). Socrates  (and  the 
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interlocutor Phaedrus) empathically agree with this view. Is that not, 
therefore, for once Plato’s serious view? In writing?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 The marble portrait of Socrates. Considered to be a replica of a bronze  head 
created by the famous Greek artist Lysippus around 330 BC. ©RMN-Grand Palais 
(musée du Louvre) / Hervé Lewandowski 
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Socrates ends his play with logoi (speeches, texts) with this message to 
rhetors, poets and legislators: if they have written with knowledge, can 
defend their work and are aware of the inferiority of the written, they are 
philosophers (278cd). This also saves Plato’s own dialogues from a 
contradiction! 
 The 7th Letter seems (at first sight) more dismissive of writing and 
speech: ‘There does not exist and will not exist any writing by me on this 
subject [that is, the truth]. For it (truth) is not communicable in words 
(rheton) like other studies, but after much interaction between teacher and 
student about the subject matter and living together, it suddenly arises in the 
soul as a light that is lit by a leaping spark, and then nourished by itself’ 
(Ep. 7, 341cd). 
 The truth is not suitable for writing or saying (rheton) to the broad 
public (341d5). Such a presentation will only benefit the few who can discover 
the truth themselves with a little help (e2-3). Others will be filled with either 
unbecoming disgust or foolish expectation (341e3-342a1, cf. Ep. 2, 314a). 
Moreover, the first and highest principles are easy to remember because they 
are ‘in the shortest form’ (344e). That is why they do not have to be written 
down either. The letter does not even allow writing down for the sake of 
remembrance. Writing and public oral lectures are therefore worth little 
compared to dialectic, and – as we shall see – the letter contains (and this is 
new) a philosophical justification for this low assessment. 
 Are Plato’s own dialogues affected by this criticism? There are several 
possible interpretations here: 1) the dialogues are not to be interpreted as 
technical works, 2) they do not directly contain Plato’s own opinions, and 3) 
they certainly do not contain Plato’s deepest thoughts (spoudaiotata 344C6). 
Now, it is obvious that the dialogue genre is different from monological non-
fiction and therefore does not fall into the category from which Plato distances 
himself. In the context of the second option (the dialogues are not Plato’s 
opinion), we must remember that Plato himself does not speak in his dialogues 
(they are not treatises) and that Plato can therefore, in a sense, claim that there 
is no writing by him. But the third option should also be considered: the fact 
there is no writing on this subject (the deepest truths: the good, the beautiful 
and the just) is true enough, because such writing is not possible. According to 
Plato, language is weak because it cannot get hold of the nature of things, only 
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their special characteristics. The good, the beautiful and the just cannot be 
expressed in the ‘unchangeable’ (written) words (343a1). Both nouns and 
definitions have uncertain references, and words are ‘unclear’ (343b6 f.) and 
are only as specific as the actual being we seek (342e, 343c). 
Phaedrus concludes the written critique with a self-reference to 
Socrates/Plato that a serious writer does not ‘write in water’ about justice, 
morality and values, since everything in writing about anything contains 
much play (paidia) and only a little seriousness. The same applies to 
everything performed orally to persuade without questioning and 
instruction, while clarity, perfection and seriousness exist only in the 
dialectic. At best, a text contains reminders for the knowledgeable (276a-
277a, 275d1, 278a1). This not only provides room for the dialogues, but 
may also contain a reference to and characterisation of them. 
The 7th Letter concludes the written critique with similar general 
considerations (344c1-e2), which are directly said to apply to Plato’s own 
dialogues (344d7-8): a serious writer does not exhibit his innermost 
thoughts in print. Plato does not write about his innermost thoughts and 
principles. Fortunately, however, we still find no rejection of the possibility 
of writing entertaining dialogues, although their usefulness as memos for 
informed individuals is now rejected (344e). The fact that all oral 
communication is also dismissed as a medium for serious thought makes the 
the conception of logos of the 7th Letter more rigorous than of the Phaedrus, 
which rejects what is said for persuasion (monological rhetoric). Moreover, 
the rejection of all oral expression of the supreme principles means that the 
letter cannot be used by the esoterics5 to support the theory of a secret oral 
doctrine. 
The 2nd Letter is most strict: avoid all writing and memorise, no treatise  
(synggramma) of Plato exists or will exist (cf. Ep. 7, 341c), and the treatises 
that already exist belong to a Socrates who has become beautiful and young 
or new (314c). The meaning of this statement is a conundrum. Naturally, it 
relates to Plato’s remarkable anonymity. He is apparently distancing 
himself from what is available by attributing previous publications to a 
 
5 This refers to the so-called ‘Tübingerschule’, which finds a secret ‘ungeschriebene 
Lehre’, a doctrine of principles only communicated orally. The authenticity of the 7th 
Letter is debated but is generally accepted. A recent attempt to reject it 
(Burnyeat/Frede) seems too speculative to carry conviction. It could have profited 
from consultation of H. Raeder’s solid philological defense (cf. n.8 below). 
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‘Socrates’ who is in some sense new (neos). The reference is then to the 
Socrates of the dialogues (not the historical figure).6 Morrow sees the letter as 
unintelligent forgery, depending on the 7th Letter and Timaeus.7 But Bentley, 
Raeder, Friedländer, Harward and others accept the letter as genuine, inter alia 
because of its (moderate) use of hiatus avoidance and vocabulary.8 
We find criticism of writing elsewhere in the late Plato: the written laws 
are imitations of truth (Statesman 300c), and it is impossible that a generally 
simple principle can be adapted to circumstances that are always complicated 
(294c). Writing laws is an old man’s sobering play (Laws 685a). 
Then why did Plato write, unlike Socrates, who wrote nothing? If we 
are to take his own words at face value (which is dangerous!), he does so as 
a game, and to remind himself and others who follow him and know what 
he is talking about (Phaedrus 276d, 278a). Contributing reasons may have 
been that the existing culture had increasingly become dependent on 
writing, and that Plato, unlike Socrates, ran a research institution where at 
least some of the dialogues could be used in teaching. 
 But why exactly dialogues? Apart from the reasons that have already 
been mentioned here, it is because they come closest to dialectic, which is the 
way to knowledge. But why is there a trend towards less (genuine) dialogue in 
the Corpus (Statesman, Sophist, Timaeus, Laws)? This is partly explained by 
Plato’s age and distance in time from Socrates (who is passive and, in the 
Laws, absent). Plato does not discuss. He lectures! As an elderly professor 
would. But he still does this under the cover of the dialogue form. 
 
Substantive problems 
In addition to the purely formal dialogue problem, there are a number of content 
issues that make it difficult to understand Plato’s dialogues. They fall into two 
groups: 
 
 
6 In Parmenides Plato’s Socrates is ‘still young’ (130e), i.e. has not yet thought through his 
own theory of forms. Cf. Friedländer 1969, 379n10 on the combination of kalos and neos. 
If Ep. 2 can be dated to the late 360’s (between the last two trips to Sicily or just after the 
third trip), Plato could claim that he is not the author of his earlier work, having Socrates 
present his thoughts. Later he has other characters discuss his views. In this way this 
passage favours an early date and thus the genuineness of Ep. 2.  
7 Plato Epistles pp. 109-118. Surprisingly, he does not consider the solution above. Cf. also 
Guthrie 1975, 65 f. 
8 Rheinisches Museum N.F. LXI (1906), 440 ff., 537. Friedländer 1969, 241-245. 
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A. There are problems and conflicting methods and opinions in different 
dialogues, including: 
Crito: Whose point of view represents the Laws who address Socrates? 
 
Laches: Courage is perseverance, but neither foolish nor wise. Or 
courage is knowledge of the terrible/hopeful, that is, part of morality, 
but also knowledge of all the good and evil, that is, all morality. 
 
Hippias Minor: Only the good can be criminal! 
 
Protagoras: Socrates believes that morality cannot be learned, while 
Protagoras believes that it can be learned. After the conversation, 
Socrates believes that morality is knowledge and can be learned, 
while Protagoras believes it cannot be learned as it is not knowledge. In 
addition, there is a remarkable defense of hedonism (unlike Gorgias). 
 
Meno: What is morality when it is neither innate nor acquired nor 
miraculous? Is the method logical refutation (elenchus) or provoked 
remembrance (anamnesis)?  
Symposium: Who is Diotima, who speaks to Socrates about the higher 
mysteries? No individual immortality?  
Phaedo: Socrates ‘proves’ immortality, inter alia with forms as 
hypothesis, but still feels a need to tell an eschatological myth. 
 
The Republic: Socrates in book i (refutatory conversations) is different 
from Socrates in the following books (abstract dialectic). Meaning of 
the Republic myth (376d, 501e) and the eschatological myth (bk. x)? 
 
Phaedrus: Socrates’ great speech (244a-257b) will supposedly be 
untrustworthy for the wise (myth rationalists 229c-230a), and believable 
for the (truly) wise. The speech is a mythical anthem that uses an image 
of eros which is not entirely implausible, but with an element of truth. 
The soul’s view of the forms runs counter to the logical conception that 
the forms are intertwined in the same dialogue. The question is, what is 
the truth here about forms, tripartite soul, anamnesis and reincarnation. 
If most of it has in fact been abandoned, then the purpose of the speech 
is not so much to convey the content as simply to inspire to philosophy 
(cf. Parmenides?).  
Parmenides: Parmenides criticises Socrates’ (!) form doctrine and 
suggests a double hypothetical method (what follows if x is or if x is not) 
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(135e f.). Is the criticism valid? If so, is Plato’s own form doctrine or only 
a misunderstood version of it hit? Is it a self-criticism? What is the 
solution?  
 
Theaetetus: This dialogue is aporetic (doubts about knowledge), and is 
also a late dialogue that so far does not agree with other positive late 
dialogues. 
 
Sophist: The Stranger from Elea argues against the friends of forms 
that being (the all) must have reason, life, soul and movement (248a-
249d). Is this a self-criticism? Who is the Stranger? Has there been a 
reversal in Plato’s philosophy, including the classification and sharing 
method, which implies that forms have many interrelationships (they 
are no longer uniform)? Here we also find the discovery of the important 
logical difference between identity and predication statements. 
 
Timaeus: What is the point of a Pythagorean advocating Platonic (?) 
physics? What is the meaning of the myth of the world’s creation? Is it 
a real creation or just an educational ploy? 
 
Philebus: Why does Socrates reappear here as a conversation leader?  
The Laws: Who does the Stranger from Athens represent? 
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Fig. 3 Socrates listens to the priest Diotima. In Symposium, Socrates recounts what he 
heard about Eros from Diotima. Bronze relief from Pompeii, 1st cent. BC, Museo 
Archeologico Nazionale, Naples. 
 
B. There are also different and conflicting methods and opinions between 
the dialogues, including:  
The Apology/Crito on civil disobedience  
Apology/Symposium/Phaedo on the afterlife (agnosticism or belief in 
personal (?) immortality)  
Protagoras/Gorgias/Republic/Philebus on pleasure 
Phaedo/Republic/Phaedrus/Timaeus on soul (unitary or tripartite) 
Protagoras/Republic on analysis of weakness of will 
Meno/Republic on opinion and knowledge (same subject matter?)  
The Republic/Laws on constitution, laws and philosophy 
Gorgias/Phaedrus on rhetoric 
Euthyphro/Phaedo/Symposium/Republic/Sophist/Parmenides on forms 
(was Plato always or ever a Platonist, that is, subscribing to the two-world 
philosophy that posterity has attributed to him?) 
 
In addition, there are problems of anonymity and mouthpiece, absurd 
conclusions,  myths, irony and humour. I would like to touch briefly on each 
of these problems, which are linked in interesting ways. For instance, the 
mouthpiece problem, myths and irony change with the new dialectic (Socrates 
versus Plato?). 
 
Anonymity: Plato never appears himself, but is mentioned in three places 
(Apology 34a1, 38b6, Phaedo 59b10). The author is hidden, like the author of 
Either-Or (Kierkegaard 1906, vol. 13, p. 410). So what is Plato’s opinion of, 
for example, Hippias Minor (absurd conclusion), Lysis (inconclusive dialogue 
on friendship), Protagoras (Socrates and Protagoras swopping opinions), 
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Parmenides (Socrates criticised), Theaetetus (inconclusive late dialogue on 
knowledge) and Timaeus (Pythagorean world-view)? 
 
Mouthpiece theory: This is related to the dogmatic view that Plato expresses 
his own opinion in his work. Antiquity seemed certain, apart from a brief 
period, that we have Plato’s opinion. Aristotle, Plato’s student through 20 years, 
has no doubt that, for example, the Republic and the Laws reflect what Plato 
meant.9 The anonymous commentary on Theaetetus (papyrus from around the 
beginning of our time) is against a sceptical interpretation of Plato and finds that 
Plato and Socrates have positive opinions (dogmata). But Socrates is a midwife 
and only an indirect mouthpiece. Plutarchus agrees: ‘Plato says...’ (Questiones 
Platonicae, De animae procreatio), but finds no mouthpiece in the early 
Socratic dialogues. In his history of philosophy (3.52), Diogenes Laertius says 
that there are four mouthpieces: Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger (in 
the Laws), and the Eleatic Stranger (in the Sophist). 
But in antiquity other dialogue characters were also regarded as promoting 
discussion. For instance, in Noctes Atticae (10.22), Gellius (c. 125-180) finds 
value in Callicles’ attack on philosophy (in Gorgias 484c-485e). And he also 
likes Pausanias’ speech in Symposium. In the commentary on Gorgias (458b 
and d), Olympiodorus also sympathises with Gorgias’ keeping promises and 
consideration of the feelings of the spectators. And Plutarchus considers 
Socrates and Protagoras to be on an equal footing in Protagoras. 
However, not everything can be equally attributed to Plato. For example, it 
would be sensible to distinguish between the historical Socrates (most evident 
in the Apology and Crito), Plato’s Socrates and Plato himself. And more 
recently there have been protests against the mouthpiece theory. More than one 
hundred years ago, in his prize essay on Plato’s development, our famous and 
still cited Platonic scholar Hans Raeder said that Plato speaks neither through 
Socrates nor through Parmenides in Parmenides, nor through the Eleatic 
Strangers or the Friends of forms in the Sophist (1905, pp. 22-24). And later: 
Plato is above his persons (1950, 22). Swedish literary scholar E.N. Tigerstedt 
 
9 For example, Politics II i-vi in general, and especially 1266b5, 1271b1, 1274b9. 
In addition, see Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 3219 (drama-oriented, older than Diogenes 
Laertius and dependent on Aristophanes from Byzantium’s school with a division 
of the dialogues into dramatic, narrative and mixed dialogues). 
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(1887-1925) argues: there is no mouthpiece because there are conflicts in the 
dialogues (1977, p. 98 f.). More recently, David Wolfsdorf has argued 
something similar: Socrates holds self-contradictory views, including the Lysis, 
and he starts with conventional definitions (1999, 20). Gerald A. Press, who has 
edited a collection of articles entitled Who Speaks for Plato?, argues that the 
Eleatic Stranger, Timaeus and Parmenides are not mouthpieces, since 
Socrates is present (Press 2000, p. 125). Similarly, neither Hamlet, Julius 
Caesar nor Lear are the mouthpiece of Shakespeare (Press 2000, p. 147). It 
may be objected that all the characters in a dialogue are the expression of 
Plato’s thoughts, his reflection on various themes.10 This does not preclude 
the possibility that some opinions, expressed by the dialogue person Socrates 
and others, appeal more to Plato, and that he changes his mind over time. 
But he tests the opinions of Socrates through much of his writing. Does 
Plato distance himself from Socrates, or does he invest more in him? In 
Meno, refutation (elenchus) presupposes knowledge (anamnesis); and in 
Phaedo and in the Republic after Book One, Socrates employs another 
method, incorporating the elenchic method into a hypothetical-deductive 
method. 
It can also be noted that there are both likeable and unlikeable (often 
caricatured) individuals in the dialogues (e.g. Thrasymachus). Plato’s 
‘meaning’ is naturally more evident in the former. But even among these, there 
are opponents of Socrates: e.g., Protagoras, Gorgias, Callicles and Hippias, who 
were considered positive, thoughtful debaters even back in antiquity. 
But basically Plato only cares about what is said, not who says it: ‘in the old 
days, people could enjoy listening to oaks or stones, if only it were true, but 
you, Phaedrus, might think it is important who speaks and where he comes 
from. Don’t you wonder if it’s right or not?’ (Phaedrus 275c). The better the 
human being, the greater the value of his support. However, the characters 
themselves are otherwise irrelevant. The stranger from Elea is only looking for 
the truth (Sophist 246d). But the truth itself is perhaps unspeakable (Ep.7, 
343a). Only 5 out of 20 dialogues in which Socrates is the keynote speaker 
give an answer (Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, Phaedrus and Philebus). The 
message is hidden behind the text or between the lines. For example, even the 
doctrine of forms is a hypothesis. 
 
10 Cf. Ostenfeld 2000. 
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Irony: Irony understood as a gap between appearance and reality is also basic 
for Sophocles (495-406 BC) and not unknown to Euripides (480-406 BC). 
Aristotle explains that unlike the braggart, the ironist denies possessing good 
qualities or underplaying them, avoiding the puffy (Nicomachaean Ethics 
1127a22, b22). 
Hegel (1770-1831) understands the Socratic method as irony and 
midwifery (1836 II, 59-67). Irony is ‘indirect communication’ for Poul Martin 
Møller (1794-1838) and Kierkegaard, who, incidentally, agrees with Hegel in 
simply defining Socrates’ method as irony and dialectic (cross-examination). 
For Kierkegaard the Apology is the pinnacle of irony (1906 vol. 13, p. 133): the 
proposed sentence involves dining at the town hall and a small fine, as well as 
urging the jury not to make any noise when he tells them the truth! Socratic 
irony is often disguised as flattery. However, it is only hidden from the victim, 
not from the surroundings (and readers)! 
‘Ignorance’ is special to Socrates. He asks questions but does not answer 
them. Socrates cannot speak directly about the Good, only as ironically ignorant 
(Republic 506b-e). He is ironic about the ideas (Phaedo), ironic about the truth 
(Apology, Symposium 199ab). The irony is Plato’s way of announcing his own 
opinion (‘indirect communication’), e.g., his view on the sophists in 
Protagoras. Or about Meno in the Meno. Or about Thrasymachus in the 
Republic. However, we should distinguish between verbal (Socratic) and 
dramatic (Platonic) irony (Griswold 1986, p. 12 f.). The first irony lies in 
what Socrates says in the dialogue itself, while the second is based on Plato 
the author’s distance to the characters of the dialogues, in other words his 
anonymity. Kierkegaard speaks of a double irony, a Socratic irony that 
breaks down, and a Platonic irony that teaches, and which Hegel according to 
Kierkegaard mixes up (1906 vol. 13, p. 340). The irony is obviously closely 
related to the Socratic ‘play’ and humour. 
 
Play: Socrates has spoken ironically all his life, that is, pretended ignorance 
and played with people (Symposium 216e, 198a). The fact that Socrates 
pretends to be excited about Lysias’ speech and not knowing anything is play. 
In other words, irony is play (Phaedrus 234d)! It is just entertainment and a 
beautiful game to play with words when you are telling myths about 
righteousness and all that Socrates talks about (Phaedrus 276c-e and 277e). The 
Phaedrus conversation ends with a comment that now we have toyed with logoi 
(278b). In the middle and late dialogues we find scattered allusions to and uses 
of play. Laws are an old man’s appropriate play (Laws 685a). The dialogue in 
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the Republic is itself a myth (376d, 501e and therefore a game (536c). The second 
part of Parmenides with its logical unravelling is a ‘strenuous play’ (137b), the 
Timaeus myth of the creation of the world is a pleasure that should not be 
regretted, a restrained and sensible play (59d), and in the Statesman the myth 
of the world’s ages is the introduction of play (268de). This also illustrates the 
link between play and myth. 
 
Myths: A myth is a story of certain beings, actions, places or events outside our 
experience (gods, heroes, afterlife, distant past, world creation). And Plato’s 
myths are of great variety. For example, there are myths about the creation of 
the world, but Plato’s myths are most often about the nature, destiny and morality 
of the soul. It is, as we have seen, a very beautiful play by someone who can 
play with words when he tells myths of righteousness, the beautiful and good 
(Phaedrus 276e). The dialogues themselves perceived as myths could well be 
in Plato’s mind here. 
Socrates is (unlike Plato) not a mythologist (mythologikos), that is, 
he does not create myths himself but takes them over (Phaedo 61b). Socrates 
does not have time to deal with myths and interpret them when he does not 
yet know himself. But he follows common practice (Phaedrus 229c-230a). 
Later in Phaedrus, however, he tells a myth of the ascension of the tripartite 
soul (the famous charioteer with a pair of steeds). This is where Socrates 
has become Plato. A distinction must therefore be made between traditional 
myths and Plato’s own myths. Kierkegaard has formulated it thus: in the 
early dialogues the myths come unmediated, while in the middle dialogues they 
are integrated.11 In other words, Socrates takes over traditional myths, and Plato 
fabricates them for specific purposes. 
 Like the Protagoras myth of the rise of society, a myth can be a 
contrast to philosophical argument (Protagoras 320c, 324d). But it may also 
be identical to or instead of an argument: e.g., the ideal state is a myth (Republic 
376d, 501e; Tim. 26c), as is the world’s creation (Timaeus 29d, 59c, 68d) and 
the ages of the world (Statesman 268e-274e), and the epistemological 
digression of the 7th Letter (342a-344d) is an ‘exploratory myth’ (344d). The 
Gyges story (Republic 359d-360b) about the invisible actor is used (by 
Glaucon) as proof that nobody is just with his good will, while the myth of the 
birth of social classes from mother earth (the land of the fatherland) and their 
genetic differences (414d- 415d) is used for political purposes. 
 
11 1906, vol. 13 pp 184ff., cf. Friedländer 1969 pp. 172f. 
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Fig. 4 Socrates and the muse of philosophy. Roman sarcophagus from the 
middle of the 2nd century AD  ©RMN-Grand Palais (musée du Louvre) / 
Hervé Lewandowski
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The eschatological myths of Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic and Phaedrus 
(246a) complete philosophical theories of justice, forms, the nature of the 
soul and anamnesis (immortality and reincarnation). Certain key subjects 
such as the true nature of the soul (Phaedrus 246a ff., see 253C7) and 
afterlife can only be set forth in myths. The same goes for love,12 the past 
(Critias’ Atlantis myth) and the creation of the world (Timaeus). 
Images and parables are related tools. The tripartite being (many-headed 
monster, lion and man in human form Republic 588 b ff.) is thus a vision of 
the human being in brief. Metaphors like the ‘ship of the state’ are another 
viable conception of the nature of the state (Republic 488; Laws 758a; 
Statesman 302a). Socrates attempts to convince the sophist Callicles with 
images of a person trying to fill a leaking jar with a sieve, or of a man seeking 
to fill cracked vessels, or of a life as a greedy bird (Gorgias 493a-494b). The 
three famous parables of the Republic (Sun, Line and Cave) constitute a whole 
theory of knowledge. 
For Plato, myths (including myths for young children) are false but 
have elements of truth and can lead to truth (Republic 377a; Phaedrus 
265bc, 276e; Timaeus 29d, 59c). The explicit lie (pseudos) can be useful 
and is used, for example, either in practice as a drug (pharmakon) against 
the inappropriate behaviour of enemies or friends (cf. propaganda); or in 
theory when we do not know the truth about the past, but can make a fiction 
which is as similar as possible to the truth and which is therefore useful 
(Republic 382cd, cf. the Atlantis myth in Critias). This is based on scepticism 
as to whether man can grasp truth without, for example, Socrates’ long 
‘mythical anthem’ about the immortal soul (Phaedrus 244a-257b, cf. 265b), 
or the ‘likely narrative’ of the creation and design of the world (Timaeus). 
Plato does not regard myths as evidence (‘a likely afterlife’ Phaedo 
114d). They are different from serious dialectic. For example, morality can 
be treated both dialectically (e.g., in Gorgias and the Republic) and 
‘mythically’ (in Gorgias’ and Republic’s eschatology). But myths make us 
better (e.g., the myth of immortality and anamnesis Meno 86b, and the class 
myth Republic 414b-415d, cf. 382cd). In Gorgias, Socrates calls the 
eschatology a ‘beautiful story’ (logos), although Callicles will probably 
perceive it as a ‘myth’. It shows, Socrates believes, that justice is also 
preferable after death (Gorgias 526d ff.), and that faith in myths will save us 
if we believe in them (Republic 621c). 
 
12 See the birth myth of eros in Symposium 203b-204c; and a mythical anthem in 
Phaedrus 244a-245a. 
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 So, are myths different from reason, or an extension of or part of 
reason? This is a difficult question whose answer depends on what lies in 
the concept of reason. The second alternative is supported by the fact that, 
according to Plato, we must work discursively towards the truth in order 
to see the truth: knowledge is a mental state (intuition). Hence Plato uses 
a visual terminology for the forms: idea, eidos (Symposium, Republic, 
Phaedrus, 7th Letter). Myths also enable us to see the truth. However, 
mythical vision is sensuous in a way that distinguishes it from the 
intellectual vision of ideas. So far, at least, myth is different from reason. 
 Aristotle says that the myth lover is in a way a philosopher, since myths 
consist of wonders, and humans both now and in the beginning began to 
philosophise because of wonder (Metaphysics 982b18, cf. Theaetetus 155d). 
This could lead to the perception that the myths of Plato are pre-
philosophical or contain primitive philosophy. Friedrich Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834) advanced such a view: Plato first puts forward a myth in which 
truth is hinted at, then he clarifies its meaning dialectically. However, this is 
not supported by the actual presentation in the dialogues. Often myths are 
inserted when dialectic comes to an end (e.g., eschatological myths, 
theoretical myths). Elsewhere we get a clarifying myth along the way (about 
a golden age and alternating world ages, Statesman 268e-274e). Or we must 
for obvious reasons just settle for a myth (Timaeus). We must conclude that 
Plato interweaves dialectic, myth and images in a unique way, so that it 
would be simplifying to say that myths or images are irrational. The very 
making of an ‘untrue’ myth is deliberate and an approximation to the truth. 
It is a question of what philosophy is and what purpose it has. For Plato, 
philosophy and knowledge have a moral purpose. Here myth and images 
have a central place. The philosopher is like a painter, using the state and the 
behaviour of men as a canvas and the divine as a model and first making a 
sketch and then, mixing the ingredients, completing the foundation of the 
state (Republic 500e-501b). 
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Fig. 5 This Roman mosaic is said to depict Plato’s Academy, and is probably a copy of a 
mural that was known from Athens in the 4th cent. BC. The figure in the middle is usually 
considered to be Plato. From T. Simmius Stephanus’ villa at Pompeii, early 1st century. 
BC. National Archaeological Museum, Naples 
 
 
However, as a poet and philosopher, Plato is also at odds with himself. The 
philosopher warns against mimesis (‘imitation’), of which the dialogues as 
drama are full (Republic 596d ff., cf. 395c). You could say that his 
relationship to myth and mimesis is as strained as his relationship to writing. 
And just as writing is accepted with certain reservations, myth is accepted 
with reservations. With the same caveat: it must not be taken seriously. It is, 
in a sense, fake even though it is entertaining and has a hint of truth. The 
truth, namely, that cannot be expressed directly in words, only indirectly in 
images, mediated by words. 
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History of interpretation:  
Debate over literalness (dogmatizein D.L. 3.51) 
Historically, since antiquity Plato has been understood ‘literally’, in the sense 
that everything Socrates in particular said was Plato’s opinion. Proponents 
of this so-called ‘dogmatic’ reading of the dialogues were Plato’s immediate 
successors in the Academy and his greatest student, Aristotle. The publication 
and systematisation of Plato’s work started with Xenokrates (c. 396-314 BC), 
the second successor, and continued with Aristophanes of Byzantium, head 
of the Library of Alexandria, and Thrasylos. As mentioned above, Thrasylos 
following an earlier edition divided the Corpus into nine groups of four 
dialogues each (nine tetralogies), which are used to this day. Behind these 
publications lies a recognition that the dialogues are inherently different, e.g., 
investigative or instructive. The dialogues were also divided into dramatic, 
narrative or mixed dialogues respectively (D.L. iii 49-50). It is noted that the 
dialogues were different, but that they all expressed Plato’s opinion: ‘Plato 
has many voices, not, as some believe, many opinions’.13  
 After a short period of scepticism (about 200 years) during the middle 
and new Academy, the dogmatic understanding was resumed in middle 
Platonism (approx. 25 BC-200 AD) and Neoplatonism (about 200-600). The 
latter considered that Plato had a hidden system which was not formulated. 
This view was to be of enormous importance in European thinking, and was 
evident in the resurgence in Plato studies with Schleiermacher’s translation 
(1804-1828) and subsequent unitarians (the system is ‘static’), most recently 
with the esoterists (the ‘unwritten teaching’ of the Tübingerschule). But it is 
also behind developmentalism in Plato exegesis (the system is evolving). 
Here, the Anglo-American analytical approach was dominant in the second 
half of the 20th century. 
Recently, however, we have witnessed a break with the dogmatic 
reading, which has roots back in certain ancient publications and which, with 
its non-dogmatic angle, also resembles the short-lived ancient scepticism. 
Interest in dialogue as art was revived by Schleiermacher in his translation 
of Plato and in today’s non-dogmatic, literary, dialogical approach, starting 
with Paul Friedländer (1928/1954/1975) and continued by mainly American 
 
13 Arius Didymus, 1st century BC, e.g., at Stobaeus, 5th cent. AD, Eclogae 2.55.5-6. 
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scholars such as Charles Griswold and Kenneth M. Sayre. It is now possible 
to ask seriously whether Plato was a Platonist. What matters is not what 
dogma Plato has and what the arguments are. Now the focus is on artistic 
elements such as the dialogue genre and its persons, anonymity, irony, 
humour, myth, ambiguity and criticism of writing. What other meaning does 
the text have than the dogmatic one? Is it, for example, educating, protreptic 
(stimulating to philosophy), majeutic (delivering) or simply entertaining? 
Tigerstedt (1977, p. 98) and K. Sayre (1995, p. 195) believe that there are in 
fact two dialogues at stake in the dialogues: the dialogue between Socrates 
and an interlocutor, and the dialogue between Plato’s dialogue (the text) and 
the reader (us). This says everything about the difficulty of answering our 
initial question: what did Plato say? 
 Griswold, for example, does not believe that stylistic grouping 
shows chronological grouping (Plato was an artist and could consciously 
change style). And even if that were the case, chronological grouping would 
not increase our understanding of Plato. Because the unity of the dialogue is 
greater than the unity of Corpus, the primary subject of interpretation is the 
dialogue. Knowing the place of a dialogue in the Corpus does not help us to 
understand individual dialogue. Instead, Griswold emphasises a dramatic 
grouping. Development is accepted, but against the developmentalists he 
argues that their arguments for development are often circular.14 And that it 
is overlooked that dialogue is also literature. The emphasis now is on the 
work of art and the distinctiveness of the dialogue. Great emphasis is placed 
on the importance of all sorts of artistic hints. Woodbridge and Randall see 
the dialogues as dramas that offer a vision rather than a doctrine. The dialogues 
do not give doctrines in response to the riddle of life, but imitate it (L. 
Strauss). But the modern interest in the dialogic and literary is in danger of 
becoming arbitrary (uncontrollable) and ending in scepticism: Plato is just a 
literary writer! 
E. Tigerstedt considers Plato studies to be dominated until recently by a 
Neo-platonic dogmatic vision (1974, p. 58 et seq.), while others trace the 
dogmatic trend back to Plato’s successors. According to the 
developmentalists, Plato simply develops his dogma. The focus has been: 
what doctrines does Plato have, and what are the arguments, and are they 
good or bad? Only in recent years has the focus been on the dialogue, and 
 
14 Chronology dependent on philosophical understanding and vice versa. 
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therefore on anonymity, irony, humour, ambiguity and criticism of writing. 
To summarise, there is a strong trend in Plato exegesis reaching back to 
Schleiermacher’s emphasis on the artistic and dramatic uniqueness of the 
dialogue. No Plato student with any self-respect can now fail to consider 
who says what to whom, where, when and why; and how. And you have 
to look at the whole dialogue, not just the arguments. 
 
An answer to the problem of interpretation 
The problem for the interpreter now is to reconcile dogma, the message, with 
dialogue in a fruitful way, to explain how dogma is modified by or interacts 
with the literary. What does it mean for the dogma who speaks to whom and 
how, and when and where things are said? Since there are two dialogues, in 
the dialogue and between the dialogue and the reader, the reader must think 
further (e.g., in the unsuccessful aporetic dialogues, and in Meno, Parmenides 
and Theaetetus). What other philosophical meaning can the dialogues have 
apart from dogmatic meaning? What order of dialogues is relevant to 
understanding: chronological, dramatic, or reading/teaching order? The 
literary and dramatic characteristics (persons, myths, humour, irony, etc.) must 
be clarified. One must assess the style, language and importance of the syntax 
for the meaning. Does the text have a role beyond the didactic role, as 
educational, protreptic (motivating) or entertaining? Is the text exotic 
(popular) or esoteric (professional), with different forms of knowledge (not 
just scientific knowledge) and different assessments of arguments (e.g., ad 
hominem arguments that go after the man)? Should the interpretation be aimed 
at single dialogues or also at the Corpus? The single dialogue must be the 
focus of attention. There are very few references in the dialogues to other 
dialogues. But we must also consider the Corpus and its possible meaning 
(orientation). And of course, the fundamental question is: Does Plato have 
an opinion? Or a project? Or does he merely discuss different opinions? 
Interpretations of Plato must deal with two issues: 
 
A. Consideration of form 
Stylistics: Many dialogues are direct dramatic dialogues (Euthyphro, Gorgi- 
as, Theaetetus, Sophist), but there are also narrative dialogues with a frame 
story especially in the middle dialogues (Lysis, Charmides, Phaedo, 
Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus and Parmenides/Theaetetus, where it is 
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abandoned Parm. part ii, Tht. 143bc). Late dialogues, to some extent, drop 
the dialogue. Some scholars believe that this is evidence of the presence of 
three groups of dialogues of different dates. In addition, the results of 
stylometry include hiatus avoidance and certain clausulae rhythms in late 
dialogues. This too points to development (in addition to the psychological 
and philosophical reasons such as the contradictions and differences in 
the application of Socrates and his method). 
 
B. Consideration of content 
The problem of what Plato says and means is linked to the mouthpiece 
problem, which in turn has to do with the relationship between the 
historical Socrates, Plato’s Socrates and Plato. Perhaps this question is 
best approached by answering another question: How does Plato the 
author use ‘Socrates’, and indeed other characters? In earlier dialogues 
‘Socrates’ is used as an ‘ignorant’ ironic interrogator. Socrates is not a 
mouthpiece, but a philosopher’s model. In the middle dialogues ‘Socrates’ 
appears as a non-Socratic metaphysician. Here and only here could 
‘Socrates’ be conceived as the mouthpiece of Plato. In the late dialogues 
he is questioned, passive or absent, and others take over the mouthpiece 
function: Parmenides, the Pythagorean Timaeus, the Eleatic Stranger and 
the Athenian Stranger. However, the problem of mouthpiece(s) is a 
misconception, as it presupposes (1) that in a given dialogue, only one 
person is the mouthpiece, and (2) that the mouthpiece expresses Platonic 
opinions. As we have seen, both assumptions are unfounded. 
The interpretative problem regarding Plato’s ‘opinion’ is the whole point 
for Plato. He thinks we ought to ask what the answer is to the questions raised! 
As readers of the dialogues, we are in conversation with Plato, who sows 
seeds in our soul. These seeds then grow through continued reading and 
preferably also through philosophical conversation with other readers. First, 
we recognise that we are puzzled (aporia). Later, we acknowledge that we 
must ourselves find the truth, which has been ‘sown in us.’ The idea is that 
we should think for ourselves instead of having finished opinions served for 
us. The interpretation of Plato involves not reproduction, but creation 
(Tigerstedt 1977, p. 101, following Leo Strauss). But it is not enough to say 
that the dialogues are protreptic, a stimulus to philosophy. They are, of 
course; but they also have a content, reflections on the material and 
immaterial, on the soul, on morality and on politics, which is chosen by Plato 
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and which we are challenged to think about. We are like the prisoners in the 
Cave! Plato leads us up. The rest is up to us. 
So, what did Plato say? 
The answer to our introductory question, ‘What did Plato say?’, is therefore 
a reformulated question: ‘What proposals for further consideration and 
debate did Plato come up with?’ A distinction must be made here between 
methodological and content presentations. A large part of his authorship is 
preoccupied with methodological questions: How do you do philosophy? Or 
simply: What is philosophy? 
 
1. Method 
In fact, the early dialogues, precisely because they end up without a positive 
result and must be rethought by the reader, contain nothing but 
‘presentations’ in a very preliminary sense. They certainly cannot be said to 
contain positive outcomes, but are rather illustrations of certain views and, 
importantly, of what philosophy is and how philosophy can and should be 
done. A Socratic conversation involves Socrates asking his interlocutor what 
a moral quality, such as justice, is. The answer could be that it is ‘to benefit 
friends and harm enemies’. Then Socrates draws some consequences, 
starting with the ‘concept of damage’ (part of definiens): e.g., that if animals 
are harmed,  animals become worse animals, and people who are harmed 
become worse, i.e. unjust people (dubious step). This means that the definition 
implies that it is just to make others unjust. Then Socrates identifies certain 
agreements on the concept of ‘justice’ (definiendum): craftsmen cannot use 
their crafts contrary to their purpose. But since it is assumed that justice is a 
craft, the just cannot make people unjust. The function of the just is therefore 
to do good, not to harm others (the example is from Republic I). The method 
here, aided by the analogy of craftsmanship, is to show that the proposed 
definition contains a self-contradiction. Socrates reduces it to absurdity. 
Another example is the following: What is piety? What the gods love! And 
impiety is hated. But (as all Greeks know!) the same things are loved and 
hated by the gods, who have different preferences. So, the definition, via 
some intermediaries, leads to the contradiction that piety and impiety are 
identical (absurd). Therefore, piety is not what the gods love (example from 
Euthyphro). Here, Socrates reduces the answer to absurdity by means of a 
general religious belief. This, of course, led to some reluctance (to put it 
mildly) on the part of the interlocutor. Socrates reasons similarly in the early 
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dialogues and thus demonstrates how moral philosophy should be practised. 
Since the proposals for definitions do not come from Socrates and are 
typically refuted, it cannot be said that anything will result apart from 
negative ‘knowledge’: we are told what justice, courage, temperance, piety, 
etc. are not. This is not entirely uninformative. But it led to Plato being 
regarded as a sceptic in Hellenistic times. However, it should be observed 
here that the scepticism of those concerned (Arcesilaus (c. 316-242 BC) and 
Carneades (c. 215-129 BC) meant something more radical and was more 
extensive than for their model, Plato’s ‘Socrates,’ who, after all, knew that 
he knew nothing and, a little surprising, also more substantial things, such as 
the fact that a good man cannot be harmed. Finally, the situation is quite 
different in transitional and middle dialogues, the so-called constructive 
dialogues. The dialogue entices us into the drama: as pointed out above, 
the dialogue contains two dialogues: between Socrates and the 
interlocutor, and between the dialogue and the reader. The form of 
dialogue is an attempt to transcend the limitations of writing.  The 
dialogues stimulate questions and sow seeds of philosophy in us. 
  
  Knowledge: faith in reason 
What do we know and how do we gain knowledge according to Plato? 
We have already seen above that in the early Socratic dialogues Socrates 
assumed that the Socratic conversation, as outlined, might be the way to 
knowledge. This conversation (‘dialectic’ in the true sense of the word) 
deals with moral concepts (and questions) rather than specific 
experiences. Unfortunately, the result was typically negative. But 
negative results are also valuable. With sufficient negative results, the 
chances of finding the right answer are greater. And there is at least a 
belief that reason, not the senses, is the path to knowledge. If we turn to 
Phaedo and Republic, where Socrates still speaks and may be a kind of 
spokesman for Plato, it is again not the senses that provide knowledge. 
At most, they can stimulate reason to seek recognition by abstract 
thinking. Dialectic for Plato is now about a hypothetical-deductive 
method inspired by geometry, which was the most highly developed 
science of the time. When confronting a problem, one must assume a 
hypothesis as an explanation and then examine whether its consequences 
are ‘consistent’ (possibly ‘implicating each other’, i.e. ‘consequences of 
each other’). If not, a more basic hypothesis must be agreed upon. In the 
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end, the form of the Good is finally achieved. This ‘way up’ takes place 
via Socratic conversation. It ends with complete understanding of the web 
of concepts. On the ‘way down’, this web is systematised by deduction. 
However, clarification of concepts is involved rather than the deduction 
of propositions as in the mathematician Euclid (c. 325-265 BC). Plato 
considers philosophy to be more basic than the geometry that works with 
axioms and postulates and relies on physical diagrams.  Philosophical 
truths are informative (synthetic), but they are abstract (apriori) rather 
than being empirical (aposteriori). Philosophy can account for and defend 
what it knows, and it knows what each thing really is.  
 
Fig. 6 Plato's Cave, Jan Saenredam, 1604. © The Trustees of the British Museum.  
 
The method is illustrated by the famous Cave in the Republic book VI. We 
sit chained to our seats in a very special cinema and follow what the shadows 
on the canvas are doing, with no idea that they reflect a reality (here ‘the 
movie’) behind us, a reality that is itself a picture of the real reality, the living 
people and nature of the outside world. This is Plato’s image of our ‘false 
consciousness’, from which it requires a philosopher who has seen through 
the deception to deliver us. This saviour, who has been outside the cave, has 
been included in the Dutch engraving (Fig. 6 in the middle). He is apparently 
one of the group of philosophers who are philosophising in a circle (left). 
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Ordinary people are lumped together (right) and are preoccupied with the 
shadow game (far right) evoked by the dolls up on the wall and the fire 
behind them. Far back, outside the darkness of the cave, we can see what are 
probably philosophers who have reached ‘up’ into the bright world of forms 
and have not yet returned to the cave to fulfil their government duty and help 
humanity out of its state of deception. Note the Latin text above the 
engraving, in which the artist connects the setting with the Gospel of John 
(3.19): ‘the light has come into the world, and men loved darkness more than 
the light.’ 
In the late dialogues, the method is the so-called method of division, in 
which higher ‘rich’ concepts are divided into lower, more specific concepts, 
which are again divided until the concept being debated is reached. This 
supposedly achieves the required demarcation and definition. And the 
division must be into ‘true’, that is, natural parts. So this is not an example 
of irrelevant conceptual gymnastics. The method also involves a prior 
collection of individual items and specific concepts relevant to the 
establishing of higher concepts which are to be divided. Examples could be 
definitions of plants or animals placed in a schema of genera and species. The 
method is developed and used to completely classify the subjects (Philebus). 
Here we have a precursor to the classifications of Aristotle and Carl von Linné 
(1707-1778). In spite of our generally non-dogmatic approach to the 
interpretation of Plato, there is no reason to doubt that the described methods 
of acquiring knowledge are Plato’s own: this is what he does, not just what 
he says. 
 
2. Content 
 
The forms 
The four major dialogues Phaedo, Symposium, Republic and Phaedrus are 
constructive dialogues. Here if anywhere, Socrates acts somehow as a 
mouthpiece for Plato. In Phaedo, Socrates talks with his friends in prison 
about the immortality of the soul owing to its kinship with the forms. In 
Symposium, the mood is different, with a number of speakers trying to 
determine the nature of love in turn. The culmination is reached with 
Socrates’ speech, which in various stages, including Diotima’s contribution, 
determines that eros originates in deficiency, not just a physical, but a general 
longing for the good and immortality and ultimately a vision of the form of 
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beauty. Phaedrus is the second positive contribution on love, now in a 
mythical speech, determining it as divine madness, a force that drives the 
soul, here portrayed mythically as a pair of horses with a charioteer who, 
with varying luck, keeps the horses on the road to forms. Finally, there is the 
Republic, which is Plato’s main work dealing with the ideal design of society 
and soul, based on the form of the Good, the most basic and most 
comprehensive ‘reality’ for Plato. Everything owes its existence and its 
knowability to the form of the good, just as life on earth and the earth itself 
owes its existence and visibility to the sun. 
 These notions of the immortality of the soul, of love and of morality 
and politics, all dependent on the forms, are commonly understood as 
Platonic philosophy: ‘Plato says...’, etc. One the one hand, it is (the Platonic) 
Socrates who speaks (not the historical Socrates, who was not so positive), 
though in one case the source is not Socrates but Diotima. On the other hand, 
all these ideas depend on the hypothesis of the forms, that is, the notion that 
reality is based on some independent structures that we cannot see but can 
only think about. Even if phenomena did not exist, the forms would still be 
there. They are timeless. One of the arguments for the existence of forms is 
the relativity of sense objects (e.g. relative size, point of view, etc.) and their 
instability (Phaedo, Symposium), and the difference between reason and 
sense perception (Republic 477e, Timaeus 51d). However, since this form of 
hypothesis is precisely a hypothesis of which Plato is critical, for example in 
Parmenides and Sophist, even this basic conception of a ‘world of forms,’ 
traditionally seen as Plato’s main contribution to the history of philosophy, 
had better be regarded as a proposal. Plato himself sees this theory as being 
open to debate. The very nature of the forms is controversial: are they super 
things, or are they what have been called universals since Aristotle (attributes 
of many things)? The criticism in Parmenides suggests that forms were 
initially perceived as super things, and that the position in the later dialogues 
changes towards or approaches the universals that Aristotle found useful. 
 
The soul and the view of man 
The human being is twofold, composed of an immortal soul and a body 
that pulls the soul ‘downwards’. It is a question of ‘looking the other 
way’, that is, ‘upwards’ towards the forms, reality (Phaedo, Symposium 
and Republic). The material physical world is a shadow world, and Plato 
likes to describe our present state as a dream we should be awakened 
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from. The incarnate soul is sometimes perceived as tripartite (reason, 
self-esteem and desire) (Republic, Timaeus), illustrated by the image of 
the charioteer with a pair of horses (Phaedrus). The notion of the 
immortal soul is the second great Platonic heritage (apart from Forms). It 
blends with and, as some (more recent Protestants) say, discolours 
Christianity. Several ‘proofs’ of the immortality of the soul are provided. 
But Plato is so uncertain about his case that he adds myths about the 
afterlife to remove doubt. The very fact that more evidence is needed 
shows that he does not dare to believe in a single proof, or for that matter 
several proofs.  
 
Morality and politics 
Moral perception is naturally related to our view of man. If we have an 
immortal soul, there are consequences for how we should behave. As the 
immortal soul for Plato is a soul of reason (see, for example, Phaedo) with a 
craving for knowledge, a life devoted to knowledge is required. However, 
Plato (in Republic and Phaedrus) recognises that the soul has other needs and 
that the moral life involves disciplining these other needs, such as material 
needs for food and drink and sex, as well as the need for assertiveness, power 
and recognition. Plato acknowledges the legitimacy of these needs but 
recommends that they should be regulated by reason. Anything else makes 
us inhuman or animal and leads to misfortune. But Plato must struggle to 
convince his contemporaries (and us readers) that it is not happiness to 
follow one’s more material desires. In a thought experiment with Gyges 
(Republic ii, 359c ff.), he shows that if Gyges can get away with it (being 
invisible to others), he will follow all his ‘lower’ desires. The same applies to 
the tyrant with unrestricted power. So, what is human nature? Plato argues 
that such behaviour is not following one’s innermost nature and real desires. 
The people mentioned are not happy, because the natural balance of the 
psyche is not present. They are discordant and basically not ‘healthy’. The 
stroke of genius of the Republic is that the ideal constitution is used as an 
image of man’s ideal and good condition. Just as the ideal constitution is a 
balance between social classes, each having its own job, so is the good state of 
man (‘health’) characterised by the fact that each part of the soul (reason, self-
assertiveness and desire) performs its function without dominating the 
others. In addition to its cognitive function, reason also has responsibility for 
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the balance and order of the whole soul. So, like Aristotle, Plato bases 
morality on and defines morality as the functioning of the human being. 
However, again we are warned that the ideal state (and soul) is a myth (376d, 
501e) and a play (536c).  
The late dialogues, the Sophist, the Statesman, Philebus and Laws, have, 
apart from Philebus, other discussion leaders than Socrates. The first two 
dialogues are illustrations of the division method, a method of defining 
concepts, while the last two deal with the good life and the good constitution 
respectively. However, the last two differ because Socrates reappears in 
Philebus as an interrogator in a dialogue that has a positive conclusion, 
namely that the good life is a mixture of reason and enjoyment; while in the 
Laws the Athenian Stranger leads the conversation in the striking absence of 
Socrates. The constitution must be as in Sparta (692a, 712d), a compromise 
between monarchy and democracy (701e, 756). The ideal, however, is 
enlightened absolute monarchy (712a, cf. Statesman 294a) and full-fledged 
community of property (739c). Laws are the necessary second-best solution 
to the political problem in the absence of an enlightened and good dictator 
(cf. Statesman 294d, 300c). The conception of a wise and good dictator’s 
cooperation with a wise legislator (710, cf. Statesman 253a) contains a 
slightly veiled reference to Plato’s attempt to implement the ideal state with 
Dionysius the younger in Syracuse (cf. introduction to 3rd Letter). The laws, 
like good doctors, must combine coercion with persuasion (in explanatory 
introductions 718b, 722b). They stand above the government, are about the 
good of all citizens and give the state unity (715). So, do the Laws express 
Plato’s opinion? Laws is mythologia (752a), fiction (712a, 752a). And as the 
words come largely out of the mouth of the Athenian Stranger, Plato has 
once again distanced himself and guarded himself against taking the credit 
for a rather totalitarian project. 
 
‘Natural science’ 
The vision of nature of Timaeus is told by the Pythagorean Timaeus and is 
based on a mathematical concept of nature’s basic components (‘atoms’), 
consisting of regular polyhedra (multi-edged, uniform, three-dimensional 
shapes), which in turn are constructed of two kinds of triangles (‘elemental 
particles’). The model and basis of these ‘atoms’ are mathematical forms or 
structures. The regular polyhedra (solids) and their conglomerates are placed 
in a universal container (a ‘room’) that, thanks to their movement, moves and 
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moves the polyhedra again. This will generate, with the help of the 
Demiurge,15 the world as we know it. This mathematical physics has been a 
landmark for later natural philosophy and physics. For a time overshadowed 
by Aristotle, but with the Renaissance and Galilei (1564-1642) and later 
science, Plato’s insight becomes apparent again. In our time, for example, 
the nuclear physicist Werner von Heisenberg (1901-1976) expressed 
admiration for the geometric, symmetrical beauty of Plato’s physics in 
Timaeus. It is important, however, to understand that Plato here is issuing 
warnings once again against taking him at his word: not only is the 
speaker a Pythagorean from Magna Graecia (Southern Italy), but it is 
merely a ‘probable narrative’ because certain knowledge about the 
physical world is not achievable. And why not? Because accounts inherit 
the quality of what they describe (Tim. 29b-d). Certain knowledge is not 
achieved through the senses, only through pure reason, at work in 
intuition and logical reasoning. 
 
Conclusion 
Any summary of what Plato said must be prefaced by a revision of a 
widespread assumption that Plato is like all other philosophers, and that one 
can therefore take his writings literally. Against this, it must be argued 
that the Platonic corpus should not be regarded as a list of finished 
doctrines that can be summarised in an article like this. The works are 
works-in-progress (working papers), meant as a stimulus to think further 
about the given presentations. But it is also clear that the presentations 
reveal a certain trend: Plato has a project. In the early dialogues and to 
some extent in some of the late dialogues, much attention is given to 
philosophical method, while the middle dialogues also (and in particular) 
contribute the thoughts that are commonly regarded as Plato’s philosophy: 
the notions of an immortal soul and a world of forms in contrast to a view 
of the physical world as a shadow or dream world. Moreover, we are 
presented with an ideal state led by experts and several argued defenses 
of morality. And finally, in the influential mathematical natural 
philosophy of Timaeus, we find an upgrade of the physical world. But 
 
15 The Demiurge is a personification of the purpose of the world. The world is an 
organism that has forms as its model.  
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even here it must be remembered that these are presentations (hypotheses, 
myths, play and irony) on the part of the author. Plato would never write 
down his innermost thoughts. Not because they were supposed to be 
secret (as some believed and still believe), but because the truth must be 
acquired personally. One thing, however, is indisputably and 
unmistakably Plato’s view: reason is the way to knowledge, and reality 
is rational. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Plato (left), with Timaeus under his arm, points up towards 
the ideas, and Aristotle (right), with Nicomachean Ethics under his 
arm, points towards the material world. Section of Raphael's 
painting ‘School of Athens’, 1509-10, Vatican Museum. 
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